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An Empirical Argument for
Nontechnical Public Members
on Advisory Committees:
FDA as a Model
Joseph L. Lakshmanan*
Introduction
While other papers in this issue discuss theoretical arguments
favoring increased representation of the public in science-law decision-
making procedures, this paper seeks to show that those arguments also
have a basis in an actual regulatory setting. Thus, although this paper is
based mainly on data from two surveys, it should be remembered that
much that is said elsewhere in this volume is equally applicable here. 1
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) uses advisory committees
as an integral part of its regulatory process. Because FDA views the
work of its present committees as technical, most of them do not have
voting nontechnical representation. Yet nonvoting consumer members
are on many of FDA's committees.
* Mr. Lakshmanan received his J.D. from Franklin Pierce Law Center where he
was a Food and Drug Law Scholar. He is presently practicing with the firm of
Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell in Washington, DC.
1 Much of this paper appears in different contexts, but in similar forms, in two
other papers. Lakshmanan, FDA's Advisory Committees: Some Suggestions
Based on Empirical Data, 43 Food Drug Cosm. L.. 877 (1988) (which details the
results of the author's surveys while suggesting some process-oriented changes)
[hereinafter Advisory Committee Suggestions]; Lakshmanan, Nontechnical
Representation on FDA Advisory Committees: Can There Be More?, 44 Food
Drug Cosm. LJ. 181 (1989) (which advances theoretical arguments for increased
non-technical representation) [hereinafter Nontechnical Representation]. These two
papers should be consulted by those who wish more complete discussions of and
citations to much of the information presented here.
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After putting the subject into perspective, the extent to which the
public is currently represented on advisory committees in FDA will be
explored. Then, data collected from two surveys of committee members
will be discussed. Next, the legal implications of present and further
representation will be discussed in light of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (FACA) powers FDA has. In particular, a Fourth
Circuit case2 will be discussed because it appears to set limits on how
FDA may increase public input in its deliberative processes.
Advisory Committees - Background
Advisory committees are "a useful and beneficial means of
furnishing expert- advice, ideas, and diverse opinions to the federal
government." 3 Legislation establishing advisory committees "shall ...
require the membership of the advisory committee to be fairly balanced
in terms of the points of view represented and the functions to be
performed by the advisory committee." 4 Similarly, agency heads and
others should follow this mandate for balance in creating advisory
committees. 5 Despite these praiseworthy words, FACA does not
mention representation by the public or consumers. Congress left most
of the details, including committee membership, to the organization
creating the committee. 6 Congress has occasionally set by statute the
groups to be represented on certain committees. Only rarely has it
mandated voting representation of the public or consumers on advisory
2 Pacific Legal Foundation v. Goyan, 664 F.2d 1221 (4th Cir. 1981).
3 Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. 2, § 2 (emphasis added)
[hereinafter FACA § x]. For a more complete discussion and citation of the
information presented in this section, see generally Nontechnical Representation,
supra note 1, at 181-84.
4 FACA § 5(b)(2) (emphasis added).
5 FACA § 5(c).
6 FACA § 8.
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committees.7 More frequently, Congress has opted for an advisory
committee that has no public members on it.8
Although Congress did not include mandatory voting representation
by a public or consumer representative on all advisory committees, it did
attempt to ensure that committee hearings and proceedings would be as
open as possible to the public. All hearings are open, except under
special circumstances; the minutes and reports of the committees are
available for public inspection, with certain exceptions as well. 9
Similarly, the public is encouraged to participate in committee
proceedings. 10 However, the standard mode of notifying the public of
upcoming proceedings is publication in the Federal Register.11
A daunting array of factors tend to lead to few members of the
public appearing at committee hearings. Few people know what the
Federal Register is, much less read it regularly to discover which
hearings are of interest to them. This is especially true when the cost
and size of the Federal Register are taken into account. 12 Furthermore,
since most hearings are in Washington, it can be extremely expensive
and time-consuming for a private citizen to attend. A private citizen may
feel that s/he does not understand the issue from the proposal published
7 The medical devices act mandates advisory committees with two of nine
members being voting public members. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(f)(3)(B); see also 21
U.S.C. § 360c(b)(2) (Nonvoting consumer and industry members mandated on
classification panels).
8 See e.g. 21 U.S.C. § 42 (The Board of Tea Experts consists of seven experts in
the field with no public representation).
9 FACA § 10.
10 FACA§ 10(a)(3).
11 FACA § 10(a)(2).
12 The Federal Register costs $300 a year [see p.11 of any issue of the Federal
Register] and consists of approximately 50,000 pages a year. Volume 51 (the 1986
volume) contained 47,418 pages, excluding indices, finder's aids and similar sections
- an extraordinary amount of paper for anyone, much less a layperson, to digest.
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in the Federal Register because the proposal was written by and for
those knowledgeable in the field. Finally, citizens may not feel that their
views will be taken seriously because of their perceived lack of
experience, credentials or education compared with other participants.
Therefore, only highly organized consumer groups, if anyone, are likely
to be on hand to represent the public. The same is true for people
interested in committee minutes or reports - especially in terms of the
time required for sifting through the voluminous material.
But even well organized consumer groups face problems under the
present process. They are rarely as well financed or as cohesive as
industrial trade organizations. Further, they do not have the manpower
necessary to handle effectively many large research projects at once (a
trade organization may be concerned with only a few issues at any one
time; whereas, a consumer group may try to deal with issues affecting
many trade groups because all of those issues affect its broader
constituency).
Even if consumer groups did not suffer from these imperfections,
they are rarely able to fully and accurately represent public concerns and
values. Moreover, such organizations may feel compelled to take
extreme, hard-line views in order to combat perceived or real industrial
intransigence, not because such views are popular with the public.
FDA attempted to lessen the problems of underfunding and
underrepresentation of the public at hearings by funding such
representation. In Goyan v. Pacific Legal Foundation, this FDA
program was found improper by the Fourth Circuit. 13 The court
decided that FDA could not fund certain groups to even the imbalance in
public representation ostensibly because Congress had not authorized
FDA to do so.14 As will be discussed later, it appears that the court
13 664 F.2d 1221 (4th Cir. 1981).
14 Id. at 1224-1227.
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was not responding to Pacific Legal Foundation's (PLF's) real
complaint and therefore, missed an opportunity to address some very
serious and valid concerns. Although reimbursing poorly-funded, but
worthy, participants is an obvious way of getting more views, a
congressional mandate is necessary before FDA can expend funds this
way.15 Even if such congressional action is forthcoming, this solution
suffers from certain problems. Those funded would likely be
consumers groups and not the public because consumer groups would
be able to present the best and most complete applications for the scarce
dollars available for such participation. Also, it is no more likely that
the public will pay more attention to the Federal Register just because
there exists the minute chance that they will be funded to present their
views to an agency on an issue about which they are concerned.
FDA's Current Advisory Committee Program
FDA currently uses advisory committees extensively. The
ramifications of classifying advisory committees 16 as "technical" or
"policy" are not slight. The membership and duties of members
changes drastically depending on this distinction. There are at least 38
standing advisory committees. 17 Of these, seventeen are technical
15 See id. at 1227 ("We hold that whether there shall be reimbursement for public
participation in agency proceedings is a decision for the Congress and not the FDA or
this Court"). Congress granted explicitly the power to support public representation
at hearings in at least three statutes: 1. The Magnusson-Moss Warranty-Federal
Trade Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h)(1); 2. The Toxic Substances Control
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(4); and 3. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 22
U.S.C. § 2692. See generally, Goyan, 664 F.2d at 1225.
16 Although § 14.100 calls the advisory bodies "panels", "committees", and
"boards", here the terms "advisory committee", "committee", and "panel" will be used
interchangeably to refer to all such groups. For a more complete discussion and
citation of the information presented in this section, see generally Nontechnical
Representation, supra note 1, at 184-86.
17 21 C.F.R. § 14.100 [hereinafter, section citations will be to 21 C.F.R. unless
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prescription-drugs-for-human-use committees, sixteen are technical
devices committees, and the remaining five are also considered technical
by FDA.
FDA specifically classifies advisory committees as technical or
policy. 18 FDA treats all of its current committees as technical
committees. 19 Any distinction between the technical and policy
committees would be purely theoretical at this time since FDA has no
policy committees. This distinction should not be one purely of
semantics, but rather could be used to great advantage.20 However,
given the current FDA usage of the terms, this paper will treat the terms
as ones of art with little real meaning given to the words.
Technical committees may have consumer or industry members on
them but only the technical experts vote.2 1 In technical committees,
nonvoting members are meant to act as "liaisons" between their
constituencies and the committee.22 These members are "to represent"
their class' interests at hearings, 2 3 but without "undue influence." 24
otherwise stated].
18 § 14.1(b)(2) ("An advisory committee may be a policy advisory committee or a
technical advisory committee. A policy advisory committee advises on broad and
general matters. A technical advisory committee advises on specific technical or
scientific issues, which may relate to regulatory decisions before the FDA."); see
also § 14.80.
19 The FDA's Office of Consumer Affairs, in its Directory of Consumer
Representatives on FDA Advisory Committees [hereinafter "Directory"], implies that
all current committees are technical by maing no distinction between the two types.
See the second page of the unpaginated document; see also FDA Public Advisory
Committees: A Handbook for Committee Members and Executive Secretaries
(1982) at p.7.
20 See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS OF THE SCIENCE COURT COLLOQUIUM (1977).
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They are to review "all official committee minutes to assure their
completeness and accuracy." 25 Further, they have educational and
information disbursement functions as well as an obligation to bring
information to the committee from members of their constituencies.2 6
The use of nonvoting members on advisory committees is of major
importance to the advisory committee program of FDA since all present
committees are technical in nature and almost 90 percent have or would
like to have nonvoting consumer representation on them.27
Voting members are, and nonvoting members "may" be,
compensated and reimbursed for their services and expenses. 28 All
members, however, appear to be paid while attending meetings of the
full committee.29 Similarly, all members appear to be paid while
working on special, agency-directed projects.30
The Results of Two Surveys
Given FDA's current system, a question arises as to whether the
committees would function better if nontechnical voting members were
on each committee. The obvious group to be asked such a question
would be the committee members themselves; yet, no one had done so
until recently. To address this void, the author performed two surveys
25 § 14.86(c)(2).
26 § 14.86(c)(3).
27 Of the 36 advisory committees listed in the Directory, supra note 19, as
wanting or requiring consumer members, only the Device Good Manufacturing
Practice Advisory Committee is required by law to let its consumer and industry
members vote. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(f)(3).
28 § 14.95(a).
29 § 14.95(b). This section does not distinguish between voting and nonvoting
members as does § 14.95(a).
30 § 14.95(c). This section does distinguish between voting and nonvoting
members as does § 14.95(a).
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of advisory committee members.31 Although the surveys did not focus
on the need for or the desirability of increased nontechnical
representation on the committees, that was at least one goal of the
surveys. 32 The responses were quite frank and tend to bolster the idea
that non-technical participation improves a committee's advice in two
major ways.
First, all groups surveyed felt that nontechnically trained members
did not hinder the process and should not be excluded. 33 Further,
consumer members played other roles than merely reacting to industry
members' positions.34 Consumer members not only play a useful role
on the committees even if they are not technically trained.3 5 Thus,
31 The surveys were conducted under a grant from the Food & Drug Law Institute.
The results are reprinted in full in Advisory Committee Suggestions, supra note 1,
at App. B.
32 For a complete discussion of the surveys the methods used in obtaining the
survey results, see Advisory Committee Suggestions, supra note 1, at Apps. A &
B. All data presented below is reprinted from App. B. The results are set forth as
follows: upper row Class(number in that class); lower row Average ± Standard
Deviation
Unless otherwise stated, all questions asked for a 1 to 5 response with a "1"=
disagree strongly and "5" = agree strongly. The numbers preceding or following a
question refer to all responses treated together. The data was also broken to reflect
the views of specific sub-groups of committee members: T = Technical members; C
= Consumer members; I = Industry members; G = Good Manufacturing Practices
Advisory Committee; S = Science Advisory Board; Ch = Chairpeople; E = Executive
secretaries; U = Unidentifiable.
33 2.0 ± 1.4 (61) 13. Nontechnically trained members hinder the process and
should be excluded from committees.
1(22) Q4) 1(6) Q3) a(l) h.8) E(2) 11(16)
2.1 + 1.4 1.0 ± 0.0 2.5 ± 1.2 1.3± 0.6 1.0 - 1.9 ± 1.5 2.5± 2.1 1.9 ± 1.6
34 2.0 ± 1.1 (58 ) 11. Consumer members tend do little more than react to
industry member's positions.
1(20) K:(3) 1(7) Kj(3) a_(1) h17) E(2) 1(16)
2.2 + 1.3 1.0 ± 0.0 1.7 ± 1.0 1.3 ± 0.6 1.0 - 2.3 ± 1.4 1.0 ± 0.0 2.2 ± 0.9
35 4.0 1.4 (43) b. They [consumer representatives] play a useful role.
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when confronted with the issue squarely, even technical members are in
favor of nontechnical representation. 36
Second, because of the way most members view the concept of
safety, the use of nontechnical members is also bolstered. All groups
agree that they use the concept of safety often.3 7 Yet, most groups do
not feel that safety is a pure question of technical fact.3 8 This may be
because most groups agree that safety involves the "acceptable risk",39
!1"(12) 92(4) 1(11) !9(5) i_(1) Lh(11)
4.0 ± 1.5 4.0 ± 2.0 3.6 ± 1.4 4.6 ± 0.9 5.0 - 4.0 ± 1.3
3.8 ± 1.4 (42) d. They have been helpful to my committee, even if they are not
technically trained.
!:(10) Q24) 1(11) f3(5) W() Qh(11)
3.6 ± 1.6 3.8 ± 1.9 3.6 ± 1.3 4.6 ± 0.9 5.0 - 3.8 ± 1.3
2.8 ± 1.5 (42) f. Their contributions are related to their technical competence.
T(12) fj(4) 1(11) Kj(4) S_(0) Ch(11)
2.7 ± 1.4 3.5 ± 1.7 2.6 ± 1.6 3.5 ± 1.3 - 2.4 ± 1.6
36 But see Brown & Richard, Advisory Committees and the Drug Approval
Process, 2 J. Clin. Res. & Drug Dev. 15, 21 (1988) (presenting data to the contrary
for drug committees).
37 4.5 ± 1.0 (67) 1. My committee often deals with the concept of "safety".
1(23) Q(4) 1(8) _Q(3) S(2) Ch(8) E(2) 11(19)
4.5 ± 1.0 4.0 ± 1.2 4.5 ± 0.8 4.7 ± 0.6 3.5 ± 2.1 4.9 ± 0.4 5.0 ± 0.0 4.5 ± 1.3
38 2.6 ± 1.2 (59) 5. Whether something is safe is pretty much a question of
technical fact.
2T(20) Kj(3) 1(8) 2(3) j(1) Ch(7) E(2) 11(16)
2.5 ± 0.9 2.0 ± 1.0 2.9 ± 1.5 2.0 ± 1.7 5.0 - 3.6 ± 1.0 1.0 ± 0.0 2.6 ± 1.2
2.6 ± 1.4 (66) 9. Whether something is safe is pretty much a question of
technical fact.
1.T(30) K:(5) 1(11) K3(4) j(1) Ch(15)
2.4 ± 1.3 2.0 ± 1.0 2.4 ± 1.2 2.0 ± 1.4 5.0 - 3.3 ± 1.6
39 4.3 ± 1.1 (58) 6. When safety issues come up, I try to put myself in the
shoes of the ultimate patient.
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which is linked to the ultimate patient and that even technical people do
not feel strongly that they are capable of putting themselves in the shoes
of end-users.40 Thus, nontechnical members play a useful role in
providing some measure of acceptable risk and how not only the public
but the user will view a product.4 1
The data detailed above suggest that FDA should increase its use of
nontechnically trained members on advisory committees and give those
members full voting status.42 Its current technically trained advisory
committee members do not seem to be against this change; indeed they
1(19) f:(4) 1(7) 9(3) j(0) Ch(8) R(2) R(15)
4.3 ± 1.1 4.8 ± 0.5 4.9 ± 0.4 4.3 ± 0.6 - 4.4 ± 0.6 5.0 ± 0.0 3.7 ± 1.4
4.4 + 1.0 (68) 10. When safety issues come up, I try to put myself in the
shoes of the ultimate patient.
21(31) f:(5) I(11) g(5) 1(1) gh(15)
4.4 ± 0.9 5.0 ± 0.0 4.5 ± 0.8 3.8 ± 1.3 5.0 - 4.3 ± 1.3
40 3.4 ± 1.1 (58) 7. To the extent that technical or professional people attempt to
put themselves in the shoes of the ultimate patient, they are successful.
1(19) (4) 1(7) -(3) a(O) ChU8) E(2) 11(15)
3.6 ± 1.1 2.8 ± 1.3 3.3 ± 1.0 2.7 ± 0.6 - 3.9 ± 0.8 5.0 ± 0.0 3.1 ± 1.0
3.6 + 1.2 (M 11. To the extent that technical or professional people attempt to put
themselves in the shoes of the ultimate patient, they are successful.
2(29) Q(4) (1 1) -(4) s(1) -h(14)
3.8 ± 1.1 2.5 ± 1.3 3.4 ± 1.2 2.2 ± 0.5 5.0 - 4.1 ± 1.2
41 It should be noted that consumer representatives for the most part do not vote on
committees, and this seems to have an influence on whether their views are reflected
in the advice given to FDA.
3.3 ± 1.5 (61) 3. Whether a member can vote on all committee business has a
great influence on whether their views are reflected in committee advice to FDA.
1(23) C(3) 1(8) 0(1) 3D) fhL8) E(2) _U(16)
3.6 ± 1.5 4.0 ± 1.0 2.7 ± 1.8 4.0 - 5.0- 2.4 ± 0. 3.0 ± 2.8 3.4 ± 1.5
42 Of course, FDA may be limited in its ability to do so when Congress has
mandated nonvoting nontechnical members. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360c(b)(2).
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seem to favor it. The question remains as to whether this change is
possible, especially in light of Goyan.
Advisory Committees & Goyan
The Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) brought suit to enjoin FDA
from expending funds to increase participation at FDA hearings by
compensating certain participants.4 3 The legal theory advanced by
PLF (and adopted by the majority) was that FDA did not have the
authority to appropriate funds for this purpose without specific prior
congressional approval.44
Although PLF's legal theory may have been FDA's lack of authority
from Congress, its complaint shows that other concerns may have been
the motivating force. The concerns seem to have been that PLF would
be forced to expend more time and money due to: 1. delayed
proceedings; 2. elongated proceedings; 3. the wide variety of new views
that would have to be supported or contradicted; and 4. whether the
"public" would be tnuy represented by applicants for reimbursement.4 5
Although these concerns are valid, the Fourth Circuit did not deal
with them. PLF's true concerns could have been addressed by the
Court requiring FDA to further constraint the program via rule-
making. 4 6 Through this process, FDA could have dealt with the
problem of delay and the need to expedite hearings, while retaining
broader representative participation. Unfortunately, there is nothing that
can be done about increased participation creating increased ideas. As
Judge Bownes has observed elsewhere in this issue, democracy is not
43 Goyan, 664 F.2d at 1222. For a complete discussion and citation of the
information presented in this section, see generally Nontechnical Representation,
supra note 1, at 189-92.
44 Id. at 1223.
45 Id. at 1224.
46 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 557 provide for such rulemaking.
I RISK -Issues in Health & Safety 61 [Winter 1990]
very "efficient," but it is what we have chosen.
The majority in Goyan was concerned with negative statutory
enactment. 47 The majority might have been right in this instance,
where Congress rejected a number of bills that would have granted the
power to reimburse certain participants to all agencies.4 8 The dissent,
however, could not accept this proposition as applied specifically to
FDA because "[t]he mandate of FDA to protect the public health is not
shared by all agencies." 49 Indeed, given FDA's mandate, the dissent
felt that the power to reimburse was plainly implied. 50 Rather than
using FDA's highly technical deliberations as a reason for discouraging
outside participation, the dissent noted that "[t]he scientific nature and
overweening importance of the subject matter with which FDA deals
leave no doubt that it may often benefit from outside assistance." 5 1
The dissent realized that this "outside assistance" would bring many
salutary effects. 52 Where the majority refuses to address PLF's real
concerns, the dissent accepts PLF's concerns arid answers them by
saying that longer, slower hearings with more participation "may,
accordingly, equip an agency to detenmine which course is in the 'public
interest."' 53 Thus, in this situation, where we must choose between
faster, less reliable proceedings and slower, more representative
proceedings, the dissent (and the author) would choose the latter -
while the majority refuses to address the basic question.
FDA's regulations were broad enough to include that process.5 4
47 Goyan, 664 F.2d at 1225-1227.
48 Id. at 1225 n.12.
49 Id. at 1229 (Judge Murnaghan dissenting).
50Id.
51 id.
52 Id. at 1228.
53 Id.
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Similarly, the Court's holding was broad enough to include the advisory
committee process. 5 5 There are, however, ways to argue that Goyan
does not affect FDA's current advisory committee scheme of funding
consumer and industry participation.
The strongest argument is that Congress has mandated diverse
representation on advisory committees. Congress has also mandated,
on some committees, the membership of "consumer" and "industry"
representatives, who do not vote, on committees. Furthermore, it
allows all members (including presumably these nonvoting
representatives) to be compensated. Finally, Congress has expressly
called for this compensation to be included in the agency's budget.
Therefore, the court's authority concerns in Goyan have been, at least
implicitly addressed by Congress.
As discussed above, nonvoting members are not the same as paid
public participants at agency proceedings. They do not represent any
specific group or organization. They are supposed to act as liaisons to
their classes, locate suitable presenters from their class, and serve as
checks on the honesty of the system. They are not supposed to present
information. The differences between committee members and
advocates are both obvious and legion.
Finally, where Goyan relies on Congress' refusal to enact an
extension of the power to reimburse participants by FDA and all other
agencies, FACA has no such "clear" negative mandate. Indeed, recently
54 "The expressed purpose of the program is '... to determine whether the process
of administrative decision-making will be enhanced by reimbursing participants
whose participation in agency proceedings contributes or can reasonably be expected
to contribute to a full and fair determination of the issue, but who would otherwise
be unable to participate effectively.'" Id. at 1222 (quoting 44 Fed. Reg. 59,174
(1979); footnote omitted).
55 The court held "that whether there shall be reimbursement for public
participation in agency proceedings is a decision for the Congress and not for the
FDA or this Court." Id. at 1227.
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the General Services Administration adopted rules that leave the
compensation of committee members up to the agency.56
It does not appear that FDA's use of nonvoting members has ever
been the subject of a legal dispute. This may be because the concerns
that worried PLF in Goyan are not present in the advisory committee
program: proceedings are not delayed; additional information is not
presented; and they add rather detract from balance.
Summary
FDA's extensive advisory committee process provides an excellent
model for testing whether increased nontechnical representation on
committees will enhance the process. Two surveys of committee
members indicate in two fundamental ways that increased nontechnical
representation would enhance the process.
First, the members are in favor increased consumer representation as
a direct matter. Second, increased nontechnical representation is
warranted because decisions of safety are not purely technical decisions,
but rather involve end-user contemplation.
Despite surface similarities, Goyan is not applicable to the advisory
committee process, especially if FDA were to increase the number of
consumer representatives on its advisory committees and give them full
voting status.
56 See 41 C.F.R. §§ 101-6.1003, -6.1033(a) (1988). While § 1033(a) calls for
uniform compensation, to be set by the agency, for all committee members, § 1003
defines "committee members" as only those who have full rights, including the right
to vote.
